Strategy & commercial review · SGX: OMK

Vividthree
Holdings

Award-winning work. Distressed economics.

Vividthree has transformed from a VFX studio into a digital-content, PR and music-venue group. Its creative credentials are real; its operating scale, balance sheet and audit trail are not yet investable.

Film & MediaEvidence grade CUpdated 8 Oct 2026
Chingay 2024 Blossom floor projection created by Vividthree
Business quality score22.6Fragile
Exhibit 00 · Chingay 2024. Singapore's 230-metre projected parade floor.

01 · Evidence · Research score

22.6 out of 100: creativity cannot fund the gap

Vividthree sits in the Fragile band. Growth optionality contributes almost half the score; Financial Strength contributes just 1.8 points out of 40.

Figure 01.1

How far is Vividthree from the field?

Beyond Our Gallery rubric · 8 Oct 2026
Vividthree Holdings
22.6
Kingsmen Creatives
59.3
Lum Chang Creations
66.0
Winking Studios
67.4
Strong threshold
70.0
Curator's note

The 37-point gap to Kingsmen is balance-sheet and operating evidence, not a judgement on the quality of Vividthree's creative output.

Figure 01.2

What lifts and holds back the score?

Points earned / category weight
Financial Strength
1.8 / 40
Market Position
4.8 / 20
Growth Opportunities
11.0 / 25
Risk Resilience
5.0 / 15
Lift / drag

PR, immersive media and venue options create possibility. Negative equity, cash burn and two audit disclaimers overwhelm it.

Sensitivity range: 18-27.

The next audit opinion matters more than the next MOU. Positive working capital and an unmodified audit can move the score; another funding failure can erase what remains.

Financial Strength1.8 / 40
ComponentWeightRating /5PointsAssessment
Five-year revenue CAGR600.0Revenue fell at a 10.1% CAGR.
Net profit margin700.0Five straight losses; FY2026 net margin was negative 502%.
ROIC / ROE900.0Negative returns and negative equity.
Cash-flow stability911.8Operating cash flow was positive in two of five years.
Balance-sheet strength900.0S$0.09m cash, S$1.94m borrowings and negative equity.
Market Position4.8 / 20
ComponentWeightRating /5PointsAssessment
Brand recognition220.8Award-winning VFX and immersive projects.
Competitive advantage700.0No evidence of durable pricing power or returns.
Market share410.8A micro player across content and PR.
Customer relationships522.0Recognisable clients, but no recurring order book.
Geographic reach231.2Malaysia, Singapore, Japan and other markets.
Growth Opportunities11.0 / 25
ComponentWeightRating /5PointsAssessment
Industry growth622.4Media and location-based entertainment are growing.
Technology adoption421.6VFX, projection, VR and anamorphic displays.
New-market expansion622.4*SCAPE venues add a new model with unproven economics.
Revenue diversification533.0Digital content, PR and out-of-home entertainment.
Strategic partnerships421.6Partnerships exist, but mm2 Asia adds counterparty risk.
Risk Resilience5.0 / 15
ComponentWeightRating /5PointsAssessment
Economic resilience300.0Loss-making before and after demand shocks.
Customer diversification421.6Projects span clients, but no recurring base is disclosed.
Technology resilience321.2Technical capability exists; the economics remain weak.
Regulatory resilience241.6Diversified jurisdictions, with Catalist compliance pressure.
Operational resilience310.6Funding, partner and key-person risks are material.

02 · Evidence · The group

A three-business group without one self-funding engine

The original VFX studio, a 30%-owned PR firm and a new venue strategy create breadth. None yet produces enough group-level gross profit to carry fixed costs.

S$1.87mFY2026 revenue · down 53%
-S$9.37mFY2026 net loss
-S$3.96mShareholders' equity
S$0.09mCash vs S$1.94m borrowings
Figure 02.1

Where does the value chain break?

FY2026 audited figures · BOG analysis
DemandOpportunity

Campaigns, immersive content, PR retainers and music audiences.

→
S$1.87mRecognition

Project revenue, with no disclosed order book or recurring revenue base.

→
-S$1.22mValue gap

S$0.98m gross profit minus S$2.20m of overhead before finance costs.

Decision lens

Gross profit failed to cover overheads in every one of the last five years.

03 · Exhibit · Portfolio and segments

The work is vivid. The revenue base is fading.

Each exhibit is labelled for economic relevance: what the project proves, and what the financial statements still do not.

Chingay 2024 Blossom projected parade floor
Singapore · Live experience · 2024

Chingay Blossom

A 230-metre floor projection demonstrates public-scale execution; contract value and margin are undisclosed.

VibranSea immersive underwater artwork
Singapore · Immersive media · 2023

VibranSea

RWS aquarium work connects VFX capability to destination media, but not to recurring ownership economics.

Disney Plus Hotstar anamorphic display at Pavilion Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia · Digital media · 2021

Disney+ Hotstar launch

A marquee campaign validates regional client access and anamorphic-content capability.

Golden Bull anamorphic display at Pavilion Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia · Out-of-home media · 2021

Pavilion Golden Bull

High-visibility work generated project leads; it did not create a disclosed recurring base.

S$1.12m

Public relations

Elliot Communications, in which Vividthree owns 30%, supplied about 60% of FY2026 revenue.

FY2024 S$2.68mFY2026 S$1.12mDown 58%
S$0.75m

Digital media & live experience

The original studio generated only about one-third of group overheads.

Down 83% since FY2024

04 · Evidence · Financials

Revenue peaked in FY2024; losses peaked a year later

The five-year picture is not one bad year. Vividthree lost S$31.8m in aggregate and ended FY2026 with negative equity.

Figure 04.1

Did cost cuts repair the economics?

S$ million · FY March · audited where available
Revenue and net loss, FY2022 to FY2026Revenue rose to 7.09 million dollars in FY2024 then fell to 1.87 million in FY2026. Net losses were recorded in all five years. FY22FY23FY24FY25FY26 2.862.917.093.961.87 -5.83-3.45-1.56-11.55-9.37 Bars: revenue · Line: net loss
Turning point

Cost cuts narrowed the loss before write-downs from S$2.53m to S$0.96m. That is progress, but not break-even.

Figure 04.2

What turned a S$0.96m operating loss into S$9.37m?

FY2026 · S$ million
S$0.96mLoss before write-downs

After S$1.31m of overhead reductions.

+
S$8.42mWrite-downs

Films S$7.23m, goodwill S$0.64m and credit S$0.55m.

=
S$9.37mNet loss

About five times FY2026 revenue.

05 · Evidence · Funding and dilution

Each raise has been cheaper than the last

Vividthree entered the market at S$0.25. The latest placements and convertible bonds were priced near S$0.016, while the share price stood at S$0.010.

Figure 05.1

How much ownership has the funding gap consumed?

Shares outstanding · millions
334mMar 2021
602mMar 2026
728mFully diluted
Curator's note

Both 2026 bonds convert at S$0.0165. If the shares do not recover, S$2.0m may instead fall due in mid-2028.

IPO · 51.8m sharesPrice S$0.25S$12.95m
Placement · 37.5m sharesPrice S$0.0583S$2.19m
Placement · 92.6m sharesPrice S$0.027S$2.50m
Placement · 137.4m sharesPrice S$0.01615S$2.22m
Two convertible bonds2% · S$0.0165 conversionS$2.00m
S$1.09mBorrowings due within 12 months
S$3.27mNet current liabilities
S$0.08mBond cash left at 31 Aug 2026

06 · Evidence · Market and peers

Margin is not the problem. Scale is.

A high percentage on a tiny revenue base does not fund a public company. Vividthree's S$0.98m gross profit cannot cover S$2.20m of overhead.

Figure 06.1

Who combines scale with profitability?

Illustrative peer map · latest reported year
Net profitability risesRevenue scale rises →
Vividthree · -502%
UnUsUaL · -20.9%
Winking · 0.7%
LCC · 21.9%
Kingsmen · 3.7%
Valuation lens

At S$0.010, market value is about S$6m and enterprise value about S$7.9m, or 4.2 times FY2026 revenue. The multiple is not cheap when revenue is shrinking and equity is negative.

S$0.010Share price · 8 Oct 2026
S$6mMarket value
4.2xEnterprise value / revenue
-96%Since S$0.25 IPO

07 · Evidence · Demand economics

Three demand engines, none yet carrying the studio

PR work is short-cycle, digital experience projects are lumpy and venues require upfront fit-out. The clocks differ; the monthly payroll does not.

1-6 months

PR retainers

Elliot supplied about 60% of FY2026 revenue across Singapore and Malaysia.

3-12 months

Digital campaigns

VFX, launches and immersive displays convert through project awards.

0-6 months

Venue ramp

*SCAPE Music Studio is open; Livehouse was due in Q4 2026.

Every month

Fixed cost

S$2.20m of annual overhead remains even after a 37% cut.

Figure 07.1

What revenue would cover today's cost base?

Arithmetic on FY2026 figures
S$2.33mOverhead + finance

The annual cash-cost hurdle before growth investment.

÷
52.7%Gross margin

FY2026's strongest percentage in five years.

=
~S$4.4mBreak-even revenue

About 2.4 times FY2026 revenue.

Mechanism

At a 50% margin, each extra S$1m of revenue cuts the loss by about S$0.5m.

08 · Decision · Strategic frameworks

A creative reputation without financial protection

Twenty years of credits, Elliot's client base and three-year *SCAPE operator rights are useful assets. None yet protects group cash flow.

Competitive rivalryHigh

Content, VFX and PR compete with larger agencies and specialist studios.

Buyer powerHigh

Project clients can tender work and impose payment terms.

Supplier powerModerate-high

Creative talent and venue staff must be retained before revenue arrives.

New entrantsHigh

Production tools are increasingly accessible and portfolios travel globally.

SubstitutesHigh

Clients can choose traditional media, in-house teams or lower-cost digital formats.

Defensible: credits, regional clients and temporary venue rights.

Exposed: every opportunity that requires cash before delivery, especially venue fit-out, staffing and the 2028 bond maturities.

09 · Decision · Risk matrix

Seven risks, led by survival capital

Select a risk to inspect its trigger and mitigation. The matrix uses written labels as well as position so meaning does not depend on colour.

Likelihood → · Impact rises upward

10 · Decision · Strategy & outlook

Four gates, in the order a distressed company must take them

Funding comes first. A venue launch without liquidity or cost discipline would add activity without solving the business.

01

Fund 18 months

Raise S$3-4m of equity and clear overdue bills.

Exit proof: positive working capital and no going-concern disclaimer
02

Prove one venue

Open Livehouse and report monthly use and contribution.

Exit proof: two quarters of positive venue contribution
03

Fit costs to gross profit

Drop subscale lines and size overheads to what the portfolio earns.

Exit proof: EBITDA at or above zero
04

Report like a going concern

File on time and disclose segment cash flow and Elliot economics.

Exit proof: an unmodified audit opinion

Interactive FY2027 scenario

How much funding does each path consume?

Selected caseBase

Revenue recovers 18% with a 45% margin; venue contribution is neutral and the group remains loss-making.

FY2027 revenueS$2.20m

Illustrative model

Pre-write-down loss-S$1.18m

Funding need ~S$2.3m

Score sensitivity22.6

Current score

Final view: the company needs proof of solvency before proof of concept.

The *SCAPE plan may be strategically sensible. It cannot carry an S$8m asset write-down history, negative equity and a near-empty cash balance without fresh capital and much tighter disclosure.

Sources & evidence

What this analysis rests on

  • Vividthree FY2022-FY2026 results and FY2026 annual report
  • SGX placement, bond, management and filing announcements
  • Vividthree Holdings and Vividthree Productions official materials
  • Sector and peer data cited in the supplied strategic analysis
  • Project images from Vividthree's official portfolio

Evidence grade C. The audit disclaimer, unresolved financing verification, absent order book and limited segment cash-flow disclosure materially constrain confidence.

Research standard

Figures are in Singapore dollars and financial years end 31 March unless stated. Market data are as of 8 October 2026. This is an independent strategy and commercial review based on public information and the supplied research, not an investment recommendation or price target.

Project images are presented as analytical exhibits; image rights remain with their respective owners.